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Lost in Translation:
Can Exporting ADR Harm Rule of
Law Development?
Cynthia Alkon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a country that is known for its natural beauty and tasty cuisine. It is
also a land whose people have experience with repressive, authoritarian, and tota-
litarian leaders. It is a land with vast potential, but its people live with low rates
of development, a struggling economy, and a government that is best known for
its endemic corruption, not the services it provides its people. The international
community decided years ago to provide foreign assistance in many forms, includ-
ing rule of law development assistance. Yet, despite all of this help, the country
still struggles. Lawyers, judges, and human rights advocates all complain that
case overcrowding is a serious problem that blocks access to justice in the court
system for both criminal and civil cases. There is no tradition or process to settle
cases before going to trial. The question is raised "why don't we pass a law to
allow us to negotiate and settle our criminal cases through plea bargaining?"
Soon a new law is passed and criminal defendants who once spent months, or
years, waiting in pretrial detention for court dates now enter guilty pleas, which
for many, means paying a fine and immediate release. The court system clears
out, case backlogs reduce, the human rights situation improves as fewer defen-
dants spend time in the poor pretrial detention facilities, and defendants no longer
spend months waiting for trials that they have no hope of winning.
It sounds like a win-win solution. It is exactly what we would want to en-
courage and is a great example to show the value of alternative processes like
negotiating cases. So, what is the problem? Imagine further that in this country
plea bargaining is seen by the general public as state-sanctioned corruption.
Newspapers and the media report that defendants are paying money to be released
from jail or to have their cases dismissed. News also gets out that some defen-
dants received better plea deals in exchange for agreeing not to file complaints
about torture or ill treatment by the police. Instead of an alternative process that is
supporting the formal legal system, the general public starts to look at plea bar-
gaining as just another form of corruption and it seems to contribute to further
eroding any remaining trust or confidence that the general public might have in
their legal system. Unfortunately, this is not a fictional account. The situation
described above is essentially what happened in the Republic of Georgia after the
country introduced plea bargaining of criminal cases in 2003.1
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. Thank you to Profes-
sors Richard Reuben and Peter Reilly for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See Section V of this article for a discussion on when promotion of ADR programs may work
against the development of the rule of law. For a more in depth analysis, see generally Cynthia Alkon,
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Examples such as this lead to the question, can alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) 2 harm the development of rule of law in other countries? Rule of law
assistance programs seem to think not, as they increasingly include forms of ADR
in rule of law development work around the globe.3 However, as these programs
increase, there is also an increasing need for better analysis of when and where to
support ADR programs as part of the rule of law development assistance package
in individual countries. Fighting corruption is one reason ADR and rule of law
practitioners give to explain why ADR should be included in rule of law pro-
gramming.4 At the same time, ADR scholars and practitioners recognize that
corruption within ADR is a possible problem in societies with already high rates
of corruption.5 However, there has been less attention to whether introducing an
ADR process could damage or contribute to delaying the development of rule of
law in countries with already highly corrupt formal legal systems and with low
levels of public trust in the legal system due, in part, to the damage that endemic
corruption may have already done to public attitudes. In these countries, a new
ADR process or program, such as plea bargaining in Georgia, may be viewed as
just another informal process operating outside the law, in the same way that cor-
ruption operates.
Plea Bargaining as Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal Justice Systems?, 19
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 355, 407-11 (2010) [hereinafter Plea Bargaining as a Legal
Transplant].
2. For the purposes of this article I am using the term alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to refcr
to the large variety of processes to resolve disputes that are not litigation and include negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration. For an analysis of how these processes might contribute to rule of law
development, see Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under Post-
Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 327, 329-30 (2002) [hereinafter The
Cookie Cutter Syndrome]. This article will focus more on negotiation and mediation due to the infor-
mal nature of these processes and the narrow concern that the informality and non-public nature of
these processes may negatively impact legitimacy and therefore the development of rule of law. Arbi-
tration could also be a concern, particularly due to the private nature of the proccedings, but in dcvel-
oping countries, for a variety of reasons that arc beyond the scope of this article to address, arbitration
tends to operate without the same level of public attention and focus as mediation and negotiation
programs. However, there is a concern that arbitration could pose a problem in countries "where the
arbitration system and administering agency is no less corrupt than the corrupt courts it was designed
to replace or supplement." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in Interna-
tional and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J.
DIsp. RESOL. 319, 341 (2003) [hereinafter Correspondences and Contradictions in International and
Domestic Conflict Resolution].
3. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides a long
list of ADR programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. See USAID, USAID Dispute Resolution
Activities in Latin American and the Caribbean, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
latinamerica _caribbean/democracy/adr/dgconflict2b.html#Colombia (last visited on Mar. 13, 2011).
4. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE 10 (1998) [hereinafter ADR
PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE], available at http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/democracyandgovemance/
publications/pdfs/pnacb895.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Jean Stornlight, is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?
Lessons From Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 586-87 (2007) [hereinafter Is Alternative Dispute
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?]; Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How Informal Justice
Systems Can Contribute, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 20-22 (2006) (describing weak-
nesses in informal justice systems) [hereinafter Doing Justice], available at
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docsO7/DoingJusticcEwaWojkowskal30307.pdf; see also Correspon-
dences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution, supra note 2, at 325-26.
6. This article will not address the situation in countries, such as Afghanistan, without even mod-
crately functional legal systems as the analysis and concerns are necessarily different in such countries.
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The question explored here is whether ADR processes introduced to aid in the
development of rule of law to help build legitimacy with legal authorities and
institutions could instead work against legitimacy or further undermine it.7 This
article will question whether establishing a new ADR program is advisable in a
country with endemic corruption that is struggling to keep, or maintain, a mod-
erately functional legal system.$ In these countries, the general public may view
informal practices that occur in private and without standard rules to be another
form of corruption and promoting such practices could reinforce already existing
attitudes about the lack of rule of law.9
This article will begin, in Section II, with a brief explanation of rule of law
development work. Section III will describe the role of legitimacy in developing
rule of law. Section IV will discuss some examples of how ADR programs are
typically included in rule of law development work. Section V will discuss when
promotion of ADR programs may work against the development of rule of law,
specifically when ADR might seem more like a new form of corruption or when it
might reinforce already existing bad practices. Section VI will offer some ques-
tions for ADR and rule of law development practitioners to consider in deciding
whether to introduce such programs to avoid harming or reinforcing already exist-
ing poor public attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the formal legal system.
These questions include: whether the dispute is private in nature and without any
larger public policy concerns; whether there are serious power imbalances be-
tween the parties; whether the public is likely to be interested in the case; whether
the general public is likely to think the new process is another form of corruption;
This article will also not address customary law or traditional dispute resolution practices that function
outside, and without any connection to, the formal legal system. For a more complete analysis of aid
to these types of dispute resolution programs and their potential contributions see generally Doing
Justice, supra note 5, at 30-55.
7. USAID recognizes the importance of legitimacy and states that it is one of the five "essential
elements of rule of law." USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, A GUIDE FOR USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOvERNANCE OFFICERS 2 (2010)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS], available at
http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/democracyandgovernance/publications/pdfs/ROLStrategicFrame
workJan-2010_FINAL.pdf. The other elements are, "order and security, checks and balances, fair-
ness, [and] effective application." Id. at 1-2.
The perception of law as legitimate and worthy of adherence underpins the rule of law.. . . In
societies where the rule of law is observed, virtually all citizens obey laws, even when doing so
contravenes their personal interests. This willingness is not based solely on the threat of sanc-
tions; it also arises from the citizens' recognition that laws are arrived at in a manner set out in a
constitutional order and subject to social input. Therefore, the laws represent the collective will.
Id. at 9.
8. For the purposes of this article, a moderately functional legal system is one in which there are
courts in place nationwide; where there are enough judges and lawyers to staff those courts; and where
cases are regularly heard and decided in the courts nationwide, not just in the capital and a few major
cities. In a moderately functional legal system there might be problems of case backlogs, but the key
concern that defines a country as a moderately functional legal system is how the general public perce-
ives the formal legal system and whether there is a widespread public perception that cases are routine-
ly decided due to corruption and that power imbalances will inevitably define the outcome (with the
powerful prevailing).
9. Another reason to exclude informal justice from the analysis in this article is that many of these
processes occur in public and often include the village and/or all interested parties. Although these
processes are not immune to charges of corruption, the open nature of the process means that they
often do not risk reinforcing existing societal attitudes regarding corruption in the formal legal system.
See Doing Justice, supra note 5, at 22.
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whether there is funding to establish the newly established process; and whether
there will be adequate monitoring of the new ADR process if it is implemented. 0
These are exactly the kinds of questions that policy-makers, ADR scholars,
and ADR practitioners give great thought to when they design ADR programs in
developed democracies." These questions continue to be asked even after a par-
ticular type of ADR is firmly entrenched, such as mandatory mediation, and even
after ADR has become the norm, not the exception, in the legal system.12 Howev-
er, it often seems that serious consideration of these issues is somehow left behind
in the process of travelling abroad and implementing programs in developing
countries. This article encourages ADR practitioners and rule of law assistance
providers to not allow the complexities of ADR processes, as they understand
them at home, to be lost in translation as ADR programs are introduced into rule
of law development programs in other countries.
II. RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Rule of law development assistance in its broadest definition is foreign aid
given to assist the development of the legal system in a given country.'3 This type
10. Thcse questions are regularly asked, in some form or another, by scholars, practitioners, and
leaders in the ADR community in the United States when examining current ADR programs or dis-
cussing whether to introduce new ADR programs domestically. See, e.g., Carrie Monkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cas-
es), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2670-71 (1995) [hereinafter Whose Dispute is it Anyway?] (suggesting three
"key question[s]" in debating settlement and adjudication which are (1) When is it "legitimate" for
parties to settle their disputes themselves; (2) When is consent "real" and when should it be allowed?;
(3) When should other values win out over party consent and determine the forum for the dispute?");
see also Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
1547-48 (1991) (analyzing the impact of mediation and mandatory mediation in child custody and
divorce cases for less empowered parties, particularly women); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1359, 1391 (1985) (examining if the informal nature of ADR processes might disadvantage racial and
ethnic minorities and suggesting that ADR processes are more appropriate between parties of equal
status and power); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619,
2658-59 (1995) (looking at how to better evaluate settlements and how settlements could include some
of the public values of adjudication).
I1. The debates for and against the use of ADR in a variety of contexts is lively, including the clas-
sic article: Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Among the nu-
merous articles responding to Prof. Fiss are some with discussions that are particularly relevant to
illustrate the domestic debate surrounding issues raised in this article. See, generally e.g., Whose
Dispute is it Anyway?, supra note 10; Luban, supra note 10; Michael Moffit, Three Things to be
Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORD. L. REV. 1203 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting
Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORD. L. REV.
1143 (2009).
12. See Jean Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of
Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289, 291-94 (2003) [hereinafter ADR is Here] (describing concerns and criticisms
of ADR and offering "five insights" into ADR that recognize it is no longer a question whether to
include ADR in the legal system in the USA due to the fact that ADR is already "an important part of
our existing system of dispute resolution.").
13. This article will not attempt to define rule of law. For a good brief explanation of the definitions
in the rule of law development field and the difference between a "thick" and "thin" approach to rule
of law, see PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT To LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITION AND
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 14-19 (2006) [hereinafter RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA]; see also Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
of assistance started with the Law and Development movement in the 1960s.14
Rule of law development assistance grew dramatically in the 1990s as the Soviet
bloc ceased to exist and grew further still into the beginning of this century as it
was an integral part of the post-war development packages in Iraq and Afghanis-
tan.'5  The United States, the United Nations, the European Union, the World
Bank, and a growing number of other multi-lateral organizations and individual
countries provide rule of law assistance as part of their overall development assis-
tance packages. Donors provide rule of law development assistance for a variety
of reasons including: to promote economic development; 6 to improve human
rights protections; 7 to promote poverty reduction;' 8 to develop or strengthen de-
mocracy; 19 to bring better safety and security to post-conflict countries;20 and to
promote peace-building and/or conflict-prevention. 21 The primary aim of a par-
ticular rule of law program, for example, poverty reduction, will influence the
type of work conducted by the program. Many donors do not have a singular
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Competing Definitions of the Rule ofLaw] (criticizing how the rule of law development field defines
rule of law and the negative impact this has on rule of law development assistance efforts).
14. For a critical history, see JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 31 (U. Wis. Press 1980). Some scholars state that this type of work
actually began just after World War II. See, e.g., Lelia Mooney et al., Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: A Conversation on its Evolution, Setbacks, and Future Challenges, 44 INT'L LAW 837, 840
(2010) [hereinafter Promoting the Rule ofLaw Abroad].
15. Because rule of law development aid can be provided in so many different ways it can be diffi-
cult to get comprehensive statistics regarding how much money is spent by donors in this area. One
estimate gives a total of $127.9 million in 2006 for "legal and judicial development." See JANPERLIN
& MICHELLE INDIA BAIRD, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, TOWARDS A NEW CONSENSUS ON JUSTICE
REFORM: MAPPING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR 30 (2008) [hereinafter Towards a New Consensus
on Justice Reform], http://www.soros.org/initiativesjustice/focus/criminaljustice/
articlespublications/publications/justice_20081124/justicc 20081124c.pdf ("It is clear, in any case,
that aid in this category has been growing. It may therefore be concluded that this area of development
has become established, despite remaining questions concerning how best to implement it and what it
should entail.").
16. For a more critical and recent view of whether law promotes development, see Kevin E. Davis &
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 937 (2008).
17. See Promoting the Rule of Law, supra note 14, at 842-43; see Randall Peerenboom, Human
Rights and Rule ofLaw: What's the Relationship? 36 GEO. J. INIL L. 809, 840 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Promoting the Rule ofLaw, supra note 14, at 843.
19. USAID considers rule of law to be part of democratization work and organizationally places it in
that category. See, e.g., USAID, Democracy and Governance, Overview, http://www.usaid.gov/
our work/democracyandgovernancel (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). One question raised is whether
democracy or rule of law should be aided together or whether rule of law is a necessary precursor to
democracy. See Thomas Carothers, How Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing' Fallacy, 18 J. OF
DEM. 12, 12-13 (2007) (arguing against taking a sequential approach).
20. See generally JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (2006) [hereinafter CAN
MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?] (describing how rule of law assistance can be improved after future military
interventions in post conflict reconstruction).
21. Towards a New Consensus on Justice Reform, supra note 15, at 17 (discussing the rationales for
criminal justice development aid).
22. However, the type of aid provided may be different although it is offered for the same general
reason. For example, the World Bank's poverty reduction development assistance is focused on for-
mal judicial institutions, while the Asian Development Bank's poverty reduction development assis-
tance is focused on community-based institutions including non-governmental organizations. Id. at 18.
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goal but include many, if not all, of the above reasons to explain their rule of law
assistance programs.
Rule of law practitioners understand that building the rule of law is long term
work that depends on many elements.24 However, exactly how rule of law devel-
ops is not well understood.25 There have been few empirical studies on rule of
law development and rule of law practitioners tend to operate more from a general
understanding of what makes sense due to their past experience in other countries
and less from clearly understood guidelines suggesting how to approach this type
of development work. 26 This distinguishes rule of law development work from
more traditional development work, such as inoculation programs and bridge
building that are more easily quantified, studied, and replicated and therefore,
have clear guidelines about how to approach and accomplish their goals.
Rule of law development assistance programs include assistance to write con-
stitutions; to draft laws; to train lawyers, judges, and prosecutors; to educate future
lawyers; and to build courthouses and supply other infrastructure, including tech-
nology.27 For the purposes of this discussion, this article will more narrowly de-
fine rule of law development assistance to focus on assistance to formal legal
institutions and not include areas such as police assistance missions or assistance
to prison systems and administration.28 Rule of law assistance work has histori-
cally taken a "top down" approach and focused on the formal justice institutions
in a country including judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and legislation.29 There has
23. Id. at 17-18.
24. For a brief history of the various areas that law and development scholars have focused on,
including an analysis of how culture has been considered a key element in building the rule of law see
Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 517-38 (2009)
[hereinafter Thinking with Culture in Law and Development]; see also Wade Channcll, Lessons Not
Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 137, 141-43 (Thomas Ca-
rothers ed., 2006) [hereinafter Lessons Not LearnedAbout Legal Reform].
25. See, generally e.g., Martin Krygicr, The Rule of Law and "The Three Integrations," I HAGUE J.
ON RULE L. 21 (2009); Randy Pecrenboom, The Future ofRule ofLaw: Challenges and Prospects for
the Field, I HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 5 (2009); Veronica L. Taylor, Frequently Asked Questions About
Rule ofLaw Assistance (and Why Better Answers Matter) I HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 46 (2009).
26. See generally BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW
(Erick G. Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003); CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTs?, supra note 20; Thomas
Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) [hereinafter The Problem of Knowledge]; Stephen
Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 161 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy]. For an overview of the criticism of current rule of law cfforts and
scholarship, including the need for better empirical work, see Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its
Promotion Abroad: Three Problems ofScope, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51 (2009).
27. Thomas Carothers has referred to this as the "rule of law assistance standard menu." THOMAS
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 168 (1999).
28. Those types of programs often include ADR components. For example, community policing
programs often include negotiation training, and prison training often includes a variety of dispute
resolution skills. For an account of an international training for police in Kyrgyzstan on non-violent
dispute resolution, see Nina Sughrue, Training Police in Krygyrstan: The Hard Work of Peacebuild-
ing, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG, http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2008/02/training-policc-
in-kyrgyzstan-thc-hard-work-of-peacebuilding/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
29. See Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy, supra note 26 (questioning the assumptions in the "top
down" approach to rule of law development). For another view of "bottom-up" legal development,
with examples from Nepal, see Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, supra note 24, at 517-
38.
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been less focus on grassroots level work.30 Rule of law assistance work is deli-
vered in a number of ways but usually includes international personnel based in
the country, or visiting regularly, to oversee the implementation of the programs. '
The specific type of assistance provided to an individual country may vary
depending on the circumstances in the country and, more importantly, the type
and degree of political engagement that the donor nation or organization has with
the recipient country. Rule of law assistance providers make frequent reference
to the need to individualize assistance programs to ensure they are appropriate for
the specific country. In response, there are now a number of assessment tools to
assist donor nations and organizations to individualize their aid packages so that
they are specific to the needs and level of development for each country.34 How-
ever, despite the improved resources and changes in rhetoric, the approach to pro-
viding rule of law development assistance still looks very similar in each coun-
try.35
III. LEGITIMACY AND RULE OF LAW
Although rule of law development practitioners are struggling to better under-
stand the variety of dynamics at work to develop rule of law, it seems clear that
one important part of rule of law is the attitudes of ordinary citizens towards their
legal system and whether they believe it is a legitimate system,36 and therefore
30. See generally Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy, supra note 26.
31. See, e.g., RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 13, at 9.
32. See generally Larry Diamond, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: The Importance of Democ-
racy and Governance, in FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY: LESSONS FOR THE NEXT HALF-
CENTURY 61 (Louis A Picard, Robert Grocisema & Terry F. Buss eds., M.E. Sharpe 2008); Steven W.
Hook, Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective: Regime Dynamics and Donor Interests, in FOREIGN
AID AND FOREIGN POLICY: LESSONS FOR THE NEXT HALF-CENTURY 86 (Louis A Picard, Robert
Groelsema & Terry F. Buss, eds., M.E. Sharpe 2008).
33. See generally GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7; see also GUIDANCE
NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: UN APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE 1-2, April 2008,
[hereinafter GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL] http://www.unrol.org/files/RoL Guidance
Note UN Approach FINAL.pdf.
34. See e.g., GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 29-41. The American
Bar Association through the Rule of Law Initiative created a number of assessment tools including the
Judicial Reform Index, the Prosecutorial Reform Index, the Legal Profession Reform Index and the
Legal Education Reform Index. See American Bar Assoc., Publications,
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
35. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule ofLaw Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN
SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3 at 7-8 [hereinafter The Rule ofLaw Revival] (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
For a more comprehensive study of current practices and approaches, see generally BERGLING, RULE
OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 13. For an earlier critique of the similarities in
approach, see The Cookie Cutter Syndrome, supra note 2, at 327.
36. See, e.g., Denis J. Galligan, Legal Failure: Law and Social Norms in Post-Communist Europe, in
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES 22 (Denis Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003) (stating that
developing attitudes of respect for law "takes time and has to be developed piece by piece in different
contexts, until the point may be reached at which it can be said that, by and large, a society has ac-
cepted law as a basis for social co-ordination"). Political actors also need to be engaged in the reform
process. See Promoting the Rule ofLaw Abroad, supra note 14, at 844-45.
[Tihe lack of progress in the area of rule of law is typically not simply a result of too few trained
lawyers or courthouses, but is due to the fact that the most important political actors within the
country have not adequately backed reform. In the end , a rule of law system is a reflection of
the underlying socio-political contract that exists within a society.
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follow the law.37 Due to this understanding that the attitudes of ordinary citizens
matter in developing rule of law, rule of law practitioners identify changing the
attitudes of the population at large as a goal, usually through "public awareness
campaigns" or teaching law to non-lawyers.38
Legitimacy as a whole is a "key precondition" to people voluntarily comply-
ing with the laws and legal authorities.39 A leading scholar in this area, Tom Ty-
ler, concluded that if people find that a law or legal authority is legitimate, they
are more likely to comply with that law or legal authority. 40 As I have discussed
in a previous article, there are two aspects to whether a legal system has legitima-
cy. 41 The first is whether people follow the law and the second is their attitudes
toward the courts, law enforcement, and government in general.42 Members of the
general public want authorities to make decisions that follow the rules and laws.
The public perception regarding whether authorities are following the law will
influence public opinion about the legal system.43 This means that legitimacy
looks at both whether the law itself is perceived as legitimate and whether indi-
vidual legal authorities or institutions are perceived as legitimate." It is this
second part of legitimacy that is most relevant for the discussion in this article.
Id. at 845; see also Gillian K. Hadficld, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting
the Rule of Law in Emerging Market Economies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 404-05 (2007) (discussing
the importance of lawyers in implcmenting new laws in the context of economic development); Ca-
rothers, The Problem with Knowledge in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 15 at 20 (Thomas Carothcrs cd., 2006) ("[Clcarly law is not just the sum of courts,
legislatures, police, prosecutors and other formal institutions with some direct connection to law. Law
is also a normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society.").
37. Connected to this is the idea that people will follow the law if they believe everyone else. Mari-
na Kurkchiyan, Judicial Corruption in the Context ofLegal Culture, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2007 99, 103, available at www.transparency.org/publications/publications/gcr_2001 (last visited Mar.
13, 2011). Tom Tyler states that "the rule of law is based upon a willingness to defer to legal authori-
ties." Tom Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological
Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 661, 668 (2007) [hereinafter Does the Ameri-
can Public Accept the Rule of Law?]. One theory of why people follow the law is "social control,"
meaning that they follow the law to avoid punishment or to reap rewards. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-23 (1990).
38. For a critical and more in-depth description of these types of programs and the underlying rea-
sons for them see Brent T. White, Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth: Corruption and the Case for
Juries in Emerging Democracies, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 307, 344-56 [hereinafter Putting Aside the
Rule ofLaw Myth]. The term "legal culture" is often used, and projects often have the goal ofa change
in the legal culture. For a critical view of this approach see generally Thinking with Culture in Law
and Development, supra note 24 at 518; see also, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?, supra note 20, at 310-
46 (arguing that "[I]nterveners must seek to create a rule of law culture [in post-conflict societies].");
see generally ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
39. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 5 (1990) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW].
40. Tom R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiv-xvi (2002) [hereinafter TRUST IN THE LAW].
41. Plea Bargaining as Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 378-80.
42. See generally WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 39; Tom Tyler, Governing Amid Diversi-
ty: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 809 (1994) [hereinafter Governing Amid Diversity].
43. People are more inclined to use corruption or other extralegal means to resolve cases when they
do not believe the legal system will treat them fairly based solely on the merits of their case. Kurk-
chiyan, Judicial Corruption in the Context ofLegal Culture, supra note 37, at 103.
44. See, e.g., WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 39, at 27-30,45-50.
Lost in Translation
Countries with high rates of corruption tend to suffer from low rates of trust
or confidence in their formal legal system. 45 One scholar who has looked at these
issues has categorized countries as either being countries with "positive myths of
law" or "negative myths of law."4 6 Individuals in societies with a "positive myth
of law" tend to think that other people usually follow the law; that the law is a
good thing and provides a fair way to resolve disputes; and that to break the law is
"socially disgraceful."A7 In contrast, individuals in societies with a "negative myth
of law" tend to think that everyone else is regularly ignoring or breaking the law.48
"Negative myth" countries also have high levels of distrust in officials and gov-
ernment bureaucracy. 49
Examples of "negative myth" countries include Russia, Armenia, and
Ukraine.50 In negative myth countries, not only do people assume that everyone is
regularly violating the law, they also put a negative spin on positive examples of
courts or government officials following the law.5' They do not believe, for ex-
ample, that judicial decisions are "ever made according to the official prin-
ciples."52 The challenge in negative rule of law myth countries is that people tend
to see law as simply a game, and as something to work around or over, not to
simply follow. 53  Within these deeply rooted understandings of how law works
people will interpret their observations about how the legal system works to con-
form to these "pre-existing beliefs."5 4 This means that even if there is change in
the formal justice system, people are likely to view these changes, at least initially,
with great skepticism and cynicism.55
In positive rule of law myth countries, scholars have found that procedural
justice contributes to legitimacy. The studies on procedural justice have found
that, for purposes of legitimacy, the process is more important to people than the
45, See, e.g., Marina Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet Societies, in LAW AND
INFORMAL PRACTicEs 25, at 31 (Denis Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003) [hereinafter The
Illegitimacy ofLaw in Post-Soviet Societies] (citing studics of Russian distrust of the police and prose-
cutors).
46. Id. at 29-34.
47, Id. at 28. This is not to suggest that serious criticism and questions are not regularly raised in
positive rule of law myth countries about the legitimacy and functioning of their legal systems. See,
e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT REs. 117, 121-24 (2004) [hereinafter The Place of Court Connected Media-
tion].
48. The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet Societies, supra note 45, at 29.
49. Id. at 31.
50. Id. (explaining that a nationwide survey in Russia reported that "83 percent of Russians regard
the police as corrupt, 79 percent assume the law courts and the prosecutor's offices are corrupt, and 71
percent believe that the high educational institutions are corrupt."). Public opinion surveys in Armenia
and Ukraine show similar levels of distrust. Id.
51. Id. at 33. This is consistent with egocentric biases, specifically confirmation traps and self-
fulfilling prophecies. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in
Negotiation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP RESOL. 683, 713-17 (2005).
52. Id. at 33.
53. The Illegitimacy ofLaw in Post-Soviet Societies, supra note 45, at 43.
54. Id. at 45.
55. Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth, supra note 38, at 335-36 (describing an example from
Mongolia of the negative rule of law myth).
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outcome.56 If people find the process was fair or just, then they are more satisfied
with the system than if they do not.57  Procedural justice scholarship examined
underlying attitudes and views about the legal process and concluded that people
think that a dispute resolution process was fair if the following key factors were
present: that they were able to speak and be heard; that they were treated with
dignity; and that the authority or decision-maker was neutral and fair.58 Within
positive rule of law myth countries, scholars have concluded that dispute resolu-
tion processes should include these basic components of procedural justice so that
the process itself is viewed as legitimate and so the dispute resolution process
does not undermine legitimacy for the legal system as a whole.59 Planners should
examine how to include these components into proposed ADR projects under rule
of law development programs.
IV. ADR IN RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
There are two basic categories under which practitioners implement donor-
funded ADR programs. The first category is when ADR programs are closely tied
to efforts to assist or support the formal legal system and to support specific rule
of law development goals. This article will focus on the programs that fall into
this first category. This article will not discuss the second category of ADR pro-
grams, often referred to as customary justice or informal justice, that donors fund
to support other goals, not directly tied to the formal legal system, such as peace-
making and customary dispute resolution processes.6'
56. TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 40, at 196 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy,
and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy].
57. See, e.g., TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 40, at 206; Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, supra note
56, at 286; Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420-21
(2008).
58. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
661, 664(2007).
59. See, e.g., Richard Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law: Making the Connection, 16 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 4, 4; see generally WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 39; TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note
40; Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, supra note 57.
60. For an example of how to consider these factors in the context of plea bargaining, see Plea
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, supra note 57, at 431. For a discussion of how to adopt procedur-
al justice concepts into pica bargaining as part of a rule of law development program see Plea Bargain-
ing as Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 383-84, 416-17. The suggestion is that these components
should be given serious consideration, not that each clement of procedural justice should always be
transported, in full, to every other culture where some factors, such as neutrality, may be less impor-
tant. Clearly, every culture, or individual within every culture, will not necessarily agree that all of
these components are important, just as the standard western style of mediation may not transfer easily
to other cultures. See, e.g., Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Con-
flict Resolution, supra note 2, at 338 (discussing how mediation may not transfer well, particularly in
countries and with disputes that may be better suited to looking back and less appropriate to the "for-
ward thinking," problem solving approach of mediation). For a more detailed discussion of the theo-
ries, effects, and characteristics of procedural justice in the context of mediation, see Nancy A. Welsh,
Making deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
787,814-16 (2001).
61. Undoubtedly many of the projects under this second category could, if viewed broadly enough,
be considered under the first category. But, under this second category implementers are not drawing a
direct connection to developing rule of law but instead have other more immediate goals, such as
addressing inter-ethnic conflict or providing dispute resolution processes in areas where courts are
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ADR assistance is included in rule of law development programs in a variety
of ways. One type of assistance is legislative assistance, which often includes
direct involvement in writing or rewriting mediation or arbitration laws.62 ADR is
also included in training programs for lawyers with negotiation and/or mediation
skills training. Some assistance programs support training for community media-
tion programs established to compliment the formal legal system, although per-
haps not directly court-connected. Some programs provide more systematic
support to court-connected mediation programs, including funding mediator sala-
ries. Some ADR assistance programs focus on adding negotiated settlements as an
accepted part of the legal process." In many countries negotiated settlement of a
case, whether directly between the parties or through a facilitated process like
mediation, was not allowed.65 The process was that every case that came into the
absent. Afghanistan provides an example under this category. Some donors assist customary law
projects to provide better access to dispute resolution processes around the country. Afghanistan is a
nation whose formal legal system is largely absent; there are few trained lawyers, few judges, and large
parts of the country are without functioning formal courts. This lack of a formal legal system mirrors
the largely absent government and is related to the on-going armed conflict in the country. Tradition-
ally, Afghans have relied on customary law to resolve disputes. Supporting customary law in this
context is unlikely to delegitimize the formal legal system given the low level of the formal legal
system's development in the country. See Noah Coburn & John Dempsey, Informal Dispute Resolu-
tion in Afghanistan (U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2010); see also U.S. Institute for Peace, Special
Report, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, 117 (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srll7.pdf; see also J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the
Judicial System in Afghanistan, 9 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev. & the Rule of Law, Stan. Inst. for Intl
Studies, Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/Reestablishing
the Judiciary in Afghanistan.pdf; AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007: BRIDGING
MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 53-66 (Center for Policy
and Human Development, United Nations Development Program, 2007).
62. One example is the mediation law in Kosovo that was passed in 2008. Law No. 03/L-057 On
Mediation, Republic of Kosovo (2008), available at https://www.asembly-
kosova.orgicommon/docsligjet/2009_3-L057_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
63. For an example of this type of program in El Salvador see generally William E. Davis, Razili K.
Datta & Sergio I. Zegarra, Implementing ADR Programs in Developing Justice Sectors: Case Studies
and Lessons Learned, 16 DisP. RESOL. MAG 16 (2010).
64. A common example is assistance to develop plea bargaining for criminal cases. Alkon, Plea
Bargaining as a Legal Transplant at 398-403 (describing rule of law assistance providers active in
providing assistance to introduce plea bargaining),
65. This is not to suggest that a legal system can prevent informal settlement of cases before they are
filed. But, once a case was filed there were, and in many countries still are, no formal processes that
allowed for settlement of the case by the parties without a judicial decision. For an overview of the
Soviet legacy in criminal procedure, see Stephen C. Thaman, The Two Faces of Justice in the Post-
Soviet Legal Sphere: Adversarial Procedure, Jury Trial, Plea Bargaining and the Inquisitorial Lega-
cy, CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MHUAN DAMASKA (John Jackson, Maximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds.
2008) (describing the formalistic and hierarchical model of the Soviet system and attempts by the
fifteen successor states of the USSR to institute reforms, including negotiated settlement of cases). For
an interesting view of how workplace disputes were resolved in the USSR and the pressure to use
formal processes, see LOUISE I. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE (1984). Shelley inter-
viewed Jewish/Soviet 6migr6 lawyers regarding their work practices in the Soviet Union. Informal
resolution of workplace disputes, including injuries to workers, were common, but not formally ac-
knowledged. In one account a lawyer "cited a few examples of directors who had chosen to settle
questions of inadequate deliveries through the illegal method of private conversations rather than the
institutional structure of arbitration." Id. at 76.
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court system went to trial and a judge or panel of judges ruled on it, sometimes
after receiving specific instructions about how to decide the case."
ADR is now commonly included as part of the analysis of how to approach
rule of law development. In 2008, the United Nations (UN) published the UN
Approach to Rule of Law Assistance, in which it stated its eight "Guiding Prin-
ciples" for UN rule of law assistance and gave six factors under its "Framework
for Strengthening the Rule of Law."67 One of the "Guiding Principles" is that rule
of law assistance should be based on the "unique country context," which "must
consider carefully" a country's "rule of law system," and should also include
looking at both formal and informal dispute resolution systems.68 One of the cat-
egories under the UN "Framework" includes "effective and accessible mechan-
isms" for dispute resolution, ". . . including alternative or traditional dispute reso-
lution mechanisms."69
The stated reasons to incorporate ADR in rule of law programming include:
to increase access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged; to decrease costs and
time needed to resolve disputes; and to increase satisfaction in the dispute resolu-
tion process. 70 In addition, perhaps the most often stated reason for including
ADR in rule of law assistance programming is to help ease case backlogs.7 The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) states that efficien-
cy "underpins all essential elements" in the rule of law.72 ADR programs are
regularly praised for helping to relieve court backlogs. For example, in the Re-
public of Georgia, U.S. officials credit plea bargaining with relieving court back-
logs. 73 However, using reduced court backlogs as a metric of success is often
without any analysis of the potential impact that the ADR program might have on
larger attitudes within the country towards the formal legal system. 74 This focus
on efficiency is also often done without critical thinking about the possible impact
it might have on how the formal legal system operates and public attitudes. 7s
66. In the Soviet Union this was referred to as "telephone justice" as judges would get telephone
calls from the Communist Party, or other governmental institutions, instructing them how to decide
particular cases. See e.g., Katheryn Hendley, 'Telephone Law' and the "Rule of Law': The Russian
Case, I HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 241-42 (2009).
67. GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 33, at 1-2.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 6-7.
70. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 4, at 7. Interestingly, party control over the dispute
resolution process is less often a stated reason to support the introduction of ADR, perhaps because
party control is often not an existing value in many other legal systems, see infra note 82.
71. See, e.g., GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 37.
72. GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 14.
73. U.S. DOJ INTERNAL REPORT: U.S.-STYLE PLEA BARGAINING IN GEORGIA 1 (2007) (on file with
the author).
74. GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 37-38 (describing a mediation
program in El Salvador that "has seen impressive results" due to mediating 40,000 cases and "84%
have reached a resolution."). No further information is given regarding what is impressive other than
the sheer number of cases resolved.
75. For an example of those questions raised in the context of developing ADR programs in the U.S.
see generally Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound- Have We Found A Better Way?, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93, 94 (2002).
[T]hose who would insist on using only efficiency criteria to assess the value of ADR programs
jeopardize the courts' most precious and only necessary assets: public confidence in the integrity
of the processes the courts sponsor and public faith in the motives that underlie the courts' ac-
tions. We must take great care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to infer
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Although USAID recognizes the importance of legitimacy as part of rule of law, it
does not specifically recommend ADR programs to help build legitimacy.76
Moreover, the focus on efficiency often occurs at the expense of more nuanced
thinking about how ADR might contribute to other goals, such as to improve or
repair the relationship between disputants or creating interest based solutions that
are not limited by the narrow options of a legal opinion or adjudicatory process.
There is, however, conflicting advice about whether ADR should be included
in rule of law programs when there are problems of endemic corruption." Within
the same USAID guide, ADR is recommended to "by-pass ineffective or discre-
dited courts" as an "alternative forum" when the "civil court system has so many
institutional weaknesses and failures . . . that there is no near-term prospect of
successful court reform."78 Conversely, the same guide recommends that "ADR
can support and complement court reform" although ADR should not be used for
this purpose if "[t]he courts reputation is sufficiently tainted to suggest that inde-
pendent programs may enjoy more popular support."79 The idea seems to be that
the only question is whether the ADR program should be closely connected to the
court, or entirely separate. Either way, ADR programs are recommended to help
meet these other goals.
V. WHEN ADR PROGRAMS MAY IMPEDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE OF
LAW
Negative rule of law myth countries could be at particular risk for new ADR
programs to harm or impede the development of rule of law. ADR programs
could undermine the legitimacy of the formal justice system in two main ways.
The first is that, due to the informal nature of ADR, these processes can seem
more like a new form of corruption and less like a process operating under the
law. Second, ADR processes can help to entrench bad practices, including cor-
ruption, precisely because they operate outside the formal legal system and there-
fore may not be subject to oversight or monitoring.
that the courts care less about doing justice and offering valued service than about looking out for
themselves as institutions (c.g., by reducing their workload, or off-loading kinds of cases that es-
pecially taxing or emotionally difficult or that are deemed 'unimportant.'
Id. at 124.
76. GUIDE To RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 41.
77. One reason for the confusion seems to be different views of whether ADR programs can help to
support a poorly functioning legal system, or whether it is better to include ADR programs only as an
addition to the already existing firm foundation of a well-functioning legal system. See Correspon-
dences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution, supra note 2, at 340
n.104; The Cookie Cutter Syndrome, supra note 2, at 334. This article is not focusing on this program
design question, but simply the question of public perceptions of ADR programs and the impact this
might have on legitimacy for the formal legal system.
78. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 4, at 10.
79. Id. at 9.
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A. ADR as Corruption?
One of the potential advantages of ADR is its informality.80 Negotiations and
mediations can take place outside of the narrow constraints of legal remedies and
allow parties to be more creative and potentially arrive at solutions that better
meet their underlying interests.8' However, it is this very informality that can be
suspect, particularly in legal cultures where party control is not traditionally strong
and where the judiciary has instead tended to take a more active role. 82 Negotia-
tions and mediations take place behind closed doors and often include a guarantee
of confidentiality. In countries with high levels of corruption, and a tradition of
the powerful taking care of themselves in private, these processes can seem like
more of the same.83 Creativity can seem like another word for corruption in such
societies known more for rigidity than creativity.84 For example, if the only poss-
ible punishment for crimes has been prison or jail time, a negotiated plea deal that
includes simply paying a fine, but no jail time, can look more like corruption and
less like creativity.
As the introduction to this article stated, The Republic of Georgia provides
one example of this problem when they introduced American-style plea bargain-
ing of criminal cases.85 Plea bargaining is negotiation of a criminal case, usually
between the prosecutor and the defense lawyer.86 If the parties reach an agree-
ment the defendant will give up his right to trial and enter a plea of guilty.87 In
Georgia, as in the United States, these plea negotiations tend to take place behind
closed doors.88 Georgia first introduced American-style plea bargaining into its
criminal justice system as part of a more general package of anti-corruption legis-
lation in 2003.89 Prior to this legislation, all criminal cases went to trial. 9 While
the trial procedures were not as long or as cumbersome as in the United States,
there were serious case backlogs as the courts were unable to efficiently handle
80. See, e.g., id. at 6.
81. Id.
82. The Place of Court Connected Mediation, supra note 47, at 118 & n.8 ("In many other countries,
meanwhile, partics' control over their cases is much more restricted. Judges, not litigants or their
attorneys, determine the issues that will be explored, the discovery that will be conducted, the wit-
ncsses who will be called, and the questions that witnesses will answer.").
83. Formal court processes in many countries that fit into the "moderately functional legal system"
definition do not open all court proceedings to the general public. The fact that the formal justice
system is also not always open to the public can contribute to poor public perceptions of the legal
system. This article does not intend to suggest that ADR processes are alone in being conducted in
private and away from public view. See, e.g., Geoffrey Robertson, The Media and Judicial Corrup-
tion, in GLOBAL CORRUPrION REPORT 2007 108, 109 (Transparency International), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007.
84. For a brief discussion of this in the context of plea bargaining, see Plea Bargaining as a Legal
Transplant, supra note 1, at 405.
85. Id. at 362-68.
86. NICHOLAS G. HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING I (2004). For a more detailed analysis of how plea
bargaining works in the U.S. with a focus on issues that might be relevant in developing countries, see
Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 390-97.
87. HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 86, at 1.
88. Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 362-68.
89. For a more detailed description and analysis of plea bargaining in Georgia, see Plea Bargaining
as Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 363-368.
90. Id. at 363-64.
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the relatively large number of criminal cases.9' However, in the period just after
the plea bargaining law was adopted, the only cases to use this new process were
corruption cases. The standard deal for these cases was that the defendant would
pay a fine and the case would be dismissed.93 This was in a country with a long-
standing practice of paying bribes to police officers and other officials to get cases
dismissed.94 Perhaps not surprisingly, the general public in Georgia viewed plea
bargaining with suspicion and there was much criticism that it was simply a new
form of state-sanctioned corruption.9 The lack of transparency, combined with
the fact that the outcomes looked very similar to pay-offs for case dismissals,
seemed to harm the general public's views of the formal legal system.%
Another form of ADR that is regularly included in rule of law programs is
court-connected mediation for civil cases. In countries that have not previously
had court-connected mediation programs, these new processes can raise questions
that suggest the already existing high level of distrust in the formal legal system.
For example, if a country adopts court-connected mediation, and the judges ap-
point mediators, the parties may question the integrity of the mediator as they are
closely linked to an institution that has limited legitimacy in the eyes of the gener-
al public.97 Related to the appointment issues could be issues regarding whether
the parties themselves trust the mediator to treat all the parties fairly and to not try
to exert pressure on one party, or the other, to accept a proposed agreement. Par-
ties may be concerned about mediators accepting bribes or otherwise engaging in
acts of corruption. Mediator styles can affect attitudes towards mediation.98
Highly directive or evaluative styles of mediation may reinforce attitudes that the
parties have little control over the dispute." This could cause parties to question
the neutrality of the mediator and whether the mediator has been influenced by
91. Id. at 367.
92. Id. at365.
93. Id. at 365-66.
94. Id. at 363 & n.28, 365-66; see also Christoph H. Stefes, Clash ofInstitutions: Clientelism and
Corruption vs. Rule of Law, in THE STATE OF LAW IN THE SOUTH CAUCAsUs, 3, 10-17 (Christopher
P.M. Waters, ed., Palgrave MacMillian 2005).
95. Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 365-66.
96. Id.
97. This is reportedly an issue with some of the court connected mediation programs in Albania.
Telephone Interview with Teresa Cannady, Rule of Law Consultant (Feb. 9, 2011) (on file with au-
thor).
98. Roselle L. Wissler, To Evaluate or Facilitate? Parties' Perceptions of Mediation Affected by
Mediator Style, 7 No. 2 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 35 (2001)[hereinafter To Evaluate or Facilitate?] (report-
ing a study of the effect of mediator style on party perceptions of the process in the United States and
finding that parties have more favorable perceptions of mediation if the mediators evaluate the case
and give suggestions for possible settlement "as long as the mediators did not recommend a specific
settlement." Id. In those instances ". . . parties were less likely to say that the mediation process was
fair and the mediator was neutral." Id.)
99. Professor Riskin's "Grid for the Perplexed" discussed mediator styles in four broad categories:
Evaluative-Narrow; Facilitative-Narrow; Evaluative-Broad; and Facilitative-Broad. Leonard L.
Riskin, Understanding Mediator's Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: a Grid for the Perpe-
lexed, I HARv. NEGOTATION L. REV. 7 (1996). Professor Riskin revised his approach and introducted
the terms "directive and elicitive" to explain mediator orientations see Leonard L. Riskin, Decision-
making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and The New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. I
(2003).
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power, corruption, or both, in pushing for a particular settlement.' If a mediation
program is started and suffers from these problems, it would at least impact the
attitudes of the parties towards the legal system, and if the news of problems
spread or were reported in the media, the negative attitudes could spread to the
general public.
B. ADR can reinforce bad practices
The private nature of ADR processes means that there is often little oversight
and the process itself is often difficult to monitor. In countries with poor human
rights records and where abusive behavior by government and law enforcement is
still commonplace, the informality of these processes may prevent exposing and
punishing bad practices.'0 As mentioned earlier in this article, when Georgia first
introduced plea bargaining, there was widespread criticism that many defendants
got more lenient sentences when their guilty pleas were conditioned on their
agreement to not file complaints that they had been tortured or ill treated while in
custody. 0 2
ADR can also provide a way to easily dispose of cases that professionals in
the formal justice system do not want to handle. In Central Asia, this has hap-
pened with sexual assault cases. 03 Sexual assault and domestic violence cases are
not afgressively prosecuted in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzs-
tan.' Legal professionals regularly refer these cases to an informal ADR process
referred to as "reconciliation."' 05 Some cases are referred before they are brought
to court and others are referred by the court system. The reconciliation process
brings the victim and offender together to discuss resolution of the case.'0 The
"neutral" who is responsible for assisting the parties to arrive at an agreement is
often a police officer with little or no mediation training, and is often the arresting
officer. 07 A common agreement is for the offender to pay the victim money and
the case is dismissed.'08 Sometimes the cases are referred directly to these infor-
mal processes and never brought to court.'" Although legal professionals
throughout Central Asia praise this process for helping to clear court dockets, the
impact on victims and the general public is far less positive."10 This process does
not encourage victims to come forward and report crimes and it does not encour-
100. For a discussion of how mediator styles can influence party attitudes towards the neutrality of
the mediation process see Wissler, supra note 98, To Evaluate or Facilitate?
101. See discussion infra Section VI(C).
102. Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 365,
103. For a more detailed discussion, see generally Cynthia Alkon, The Increased Use of "Reconcilia-
tion" in Criminal Cases in Central Asia: A Sign of Restorative Justice, Reform or Cause for Concern?,
8 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 41 (2007) [hereinafter Reconciliation ofCriminal Cases in Central Asia].
104. Id. at 104-06.
105. Id
106. Id. at 79-100 (describing the individual processes and practices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzebekistan).
107. Id. at 109-10.
108. On occasion more disturbing outcomes were reported, such as rape victims agreeing to marry
their attackers. Id. at 41, 113-14.
109. Id. at 104-07.
110. See id.
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age trust in the formal legal system."' And, in societies that suffer from endemic
corruption, these processes, with their monetary payments, can look like one more
form of corruption."12
VI. QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING WHETHER TO INTRODUCE AN
ADR PROGRAM
If ADR practitioners and rule of law assistance providers are considering
supporting an ADR program in a country whose legal system suffers from poor
legitimacy due to high public perceptions of corruption, serious consideration
should be given to whether such a program will delay or harm the development of
rule of law by reinforcing already existing poor public attitudes regarding the
formal legal system and its legitimacy. Clearly, the challenge with this stage of
the analysis is the problem with the continuing "lack of knowledge" regarding
how rule of law develops and, related to that, how legitimacy develops." 3
Nevertheless, there are a few key questions that might aid rule of law and
ADR practitioners in this analysis that are questions regularly asked in the context
of developing ADR programs in developed democracies." 4 The first is what type
of dispute would go to this process?"s The second is who are the parties? The
third question is how likely is it that it is, or should be, a matter of public interest?
The fourth question is what is the public attitude towards the proposed ADR
project? A fifth question is whether there is funding to establish the newly envi-
sioned process? And, the final question, if the ADR program is in process or will
be implemented, how will it be monitored?
A. What type of dispute?
Private civil disputes that have few, if any, public policy or larger political
concerns might be disputes that would make sense to design an alternative dispute
resolution program for, even in moderately functional legal systems with endemic
corruption. It is unlikely that public policy cases, administrative cases, or even
criminal cases, would generally fit into this category. However, family cases
might fall under this category. The caution is whether it is a country with serious
111. Id. at 104-07.
112. Id. at 103 (discussing how corruption may impact the decision to send cases to reconciliation).
113. The studies of legitimacy define legitimacy, identify when it exists, and identify what may cause
it to erode. These studies are less helpful in providing suggestions of how to build legitimacy. See,
e.g., David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE-
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 30, 54-56 (Tom Tyler, ed., Russell Sage Foundation 2007).
114. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text. There are clearly other questions that could be
relevant regarding program design issues, such as whether parties should be provided legal representa-
tion. These questions are beyond the scope of this article. For an analysis of the issue of unrepre-
sented litigants in ADR processes in the U.S., see Jean Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution:
Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381 (2010) (criticizing the assumption that litigants
always need lawyers more in litigation than in ADR processes, particularly as ADR may be "the only
form of dispute resolution many disputants get." Id. at 383).
115. Numerous scholars have expressed concerns about bringing certain types of disputes to informal
dispute resolution processes, such as domestic violence cases, cases with racial or ethnic disputes, and
cases that raise larger public policy interests. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 10; Delgado et. al., supra
note 10; Luban, supra note 10.
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inequality for women and whether mediating these cases could exacerbate those
inequalities." Land disputes might also be cases to bring to this type of
process,"'7 but if the origin of the dispute is ethnic conflict or land seized during
war, this might not be appropriate." 8 However, in many countries the civil dock-
ets are full of cases that would be appropriate to bring to an ADR process and that
are overwhelming judicial resources.
This goal of easing case backlogs is, as stated above, a key reason for the de-
velopment of many ADR programs as part of a larger rule of law development
assistance package. Clearly, if the courts are so overcrowded that cases languish
for years, or decades, this will also create, or exacerbate problems for legitimacy
of the formal justice system. In these contexts, adding processes that can help
move cases through the formal legal system more quickly could be a goal that
enhances legitimacy and therefore rule of law. However, careful consideration
should be given to whether there are other, more serious concerns, such as serious
inequities between the parties, that might mean that an informal process, such as
mediation, will not support the larger goals of improving legitimacy for the formal
legal system. If dispute resolution programs are designed to help handle disputes
that are filling the formal courtrooms, and if these disputes do not tend to have
larger public policy or political concerns, then an ADR process might be appro-
priate, pending the answers to the next questions.
B. Who are the parties?
ADR practitioners generally advise caution and often advise against an ADR
process when there are serious power imbalances between the parties."'9 The
challenge in many countries is for outsiders to determine if there are power imbal-
ances and whether they are so serious that ADR processes are not advisable.i 20 In
I 16. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 10; Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and
the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). For an alternative view suggesting the use of
restorative justice processes for domestic violence, see generally Laurie S. Kohn, What's So Funny
About Peace, Love and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence
Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517 (2010).
117. Robert Mitchell, Land Rights Legal Aid, ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE
ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 377 at 376-379 (Roy L. Prosterman, Robert Mitchell and Tim
Hanstad eds. 2007) [hereinafter Land Rights Legal Aid|(explaining how it is preferable to resolved
land dispute cases outside of court if there are not serious power imbalances as it is a more efficient
use of legal aid resources, provides quicker relief to the client, creates "less friction between the client
and the opposing party, with whom the client will continue to live and work in the same community"
and "may allow all parties to save face." Id. at 378)
118. USAID seems to recommend using alternative processes with land disputes with few stated
reservations. See USAID, LAND AND CONFLICT: A TOOLKIT FOR INTERVENTION 10 (2005), available
at http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/cross-cuttingprograms/conflict/publications/docsCMMLand
andConflictToolkitApril 2005.pdf
("[Elxperience has also shown that many types of land disputes are best managed outside the courts.
Limited court capacity to process land claims efficiently and transparently is a serious constraint in
many places. Thus, alternative dispute resolution processes, especially mediation and arbitration, can
be useful .. . .").
119. One reason for this is the assumption that a formal legal process will better protect the less
powerful. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note I1, at 1076-78. Clearly this assumption may not be as accurate in
a moderately functioning legal system.
120. One interesting study about postwar Japan criticized the use of mediation as it "reinforces the
power structure of local society." FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 12
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most of the types of countries that this article is discussing, if one of the parties is
the government or a governmental agency, ADR processes are not appropriate.' 2 1
In societies where women or minorities suffer from regular mistreatment, their
cases are probably not best served by informal ADR processes, particularly if their
gender or ethnicity is, or could be, a factor in the case, including how the mediator
might view or treat them.122 A related issue to who the parties are is determining
whether they would prefer to resolve their dispute, through an informal or formal
process.123 Answering this question is not simple, and gaining a better under-
standing of how litigants prefer to settle their disputes within established legal
systems, such as in the United States, is still an area scholars are researching and
debating.124 However, in establishing new ADR programs in moderately func-
tional legal systems, the question of who the parties are should look both to
whether they might be disadvantaged by an informal process and whether they
might prefer, and be more comfortable, resolving their dispute in an informal
process.
C. Is it, or should it be, a matter ofpublic interest?
It can be difficult to define what is a matter of "public interest," although cer-
tain categories of cases, like corruption cases against public officials and cases
alleging police misconduct or torture, are the types of cases that are likely to fall
within the definition.125 And, corruption and police misconduct cases are precise-
ly the kind of cases that can help to build, or erode, legitimacy in the formal legal
(Harvard 1987) (Unlike litigation, which would "not only bypass the current power structure but would
destroy it whenever ... the formal norms of the legal system were substantially at variance with those
of the elite.").
121. This is not to suggest that the formal justice system is not also subject to concems regarding
inappropriate use of governmental power such as exercising undue influence and lack of judicial inde-
pendence. But, at least in the formal justice system the dispute is likely to be heard publicly and in a
way that could, at least theoretically, be appealed. One example of this is the formal criminal justice
system in Central Asia, including the lack of judicial independence, see Reconciliation of Criminal
Cases in Central Asia, supra note 103, at 59-66.
122. Mitchell, Land Rights Legal Aid, supra note 117 at 388. ("Mediation and other 'neutral'
processes are often decidedly not neutral in cases involving [land] disputes between the poor and the
non-poor (or between the poor and government officials) since such processes inevitably reinforce
unequal relations that precede the dispute.").
123. In countries where international actors provide development assistance focused on particular
types of disputes, such as land disputes, a related factor is what impact the international actor, by their
mere presence, may have on the process itself, thereby influencing which process the parties might
prefer. In land disputes involving serious power imbalances one development professional observed
that the process, whether it is mediation, arbitration, or litigation, is less important than the fact of
international involvement. "Once an international actor is involved, rules are more closely scrutinized
and respected, procedures are more closely followed. The international factor changes the fairness
dynamic and rebalances the power equation ... [i]t gives the weaker party a better chance than they
otherwise would have had." Email (February 16, 2011) from Eric Roman Filipink (on file with au-
thor).
124, See, e.g., ADR is Here, supra note 12, at 296-300.
125. In discussing whether disputes of public interest within the U.S. should be resolved publicly or
privately, Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that the question is less about whether the process is public
or private and more about the entirety of the process, and whether it considers the interests of both the
parties and those "likely to be affected by the outcome, including in some cases, the whole polity."
Whose Dispute is it Anyway?, supra note 10, at 2686.
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
system and government. If those cases are decided in private, it could influence
other potential litigants and perhaps impede them from bringing cases (and there-
by addressing these issues).126  Using informal processes could also negatively
influence the development of formal legal protections and ultimately slow, or
stop, political or social change that a formal court process might stimulate.' 27 In
countries whose formal legal systems already suffer from problems of legitimacy,
a process that regularly resolves these cases in informal and private settings could
reinforce the general public's view that power and corruption decide cases, instead
of a law that is applied fairly to all. As discussed above, this was a problem in
Georgia as plea bargaining negotiations were used with corruption cases and with
cases alleging police misconduct and the general public viewed these case settle-
ments as payments for favorable outcomes.128
Related to the concern about whether the case itself is one of public interest,
is the public interest in how cases are resolved. Within the United States media-
tion was "inspired by the principles of democracy." 29 This meant that early med-
iation proponents looked to the role that individual citizens could have in resolv-
ing their disputes directly while being able to control the outcomes.130 However,
if an ADR program is designed primarily with the goal of efficient case resolution,
it may miss out on other goals, such as greater democratic participation of citizens
in their justice system. Ultimately this could negatively impact how the general
public views the new ADR program and that negative view could extend to the
formal legal system that is implementing it.'3 1 These concerns have been raised
within the context of mandatory mediation programs in the United States. 32
D. What is the public attitude toward the proposed ADR project?
Before starting a new ADR project there should be a clear understanding of
what the general public's attitude might be towards the project.'33 Is it likely to be
greeted with skepticism and cynicism? It seems likely that if those questions were
asked in Georgia it would have been clear that the public would greet the intro-
126. For a discussion of the potential problem of "secret settlements" of dispute with wider public
interest in the U.S., see, e.g., Luban, supra note 10, 2648-58.
127. For a study of how disputes going to informal dispute resolution processes might have slowed
change in Japan, see generally UPHAM, supra note 120 (cxamining disputes in specific case studies
including environmental, women's employment discrimination, and industrial policy). See also ADR
is Here, supra note 12, at 296 (discussing the ability of dispute resolution to impact society).
128. Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note I, at 365-66.
129. The Place of Court Connected Mediation, supra note 47, at 135.
130. Id. at 135-36.
131. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67-SPG
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 at 314-18(2004).
132. See, e.g., The Place of Court Connected Mediation, supra note 47. at 136-43. "Yet, change
should be tempered by context, and even as the judicial system changes, it should reflect the values of
our democracy. Our courts draw their legitimacy from their accountability to, and the responding
support of, a democratic people." Id. at 143.
133. However, it is not enough to merely ask questions. Part of the project planning phase should
include a clear way to incorporate what is learned about public opinion into how the project is imple-
mented. Unfortunately, Nepal provides an example of a country where USAID arranged for a poll to
gain a better understanding of how the general public viewed their human and legal rights, and then did
not incorporate those findings into any of the programmatic work. Thinking with Culture in Law and
Development, supra note 24, at 549-50.
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duction of plea bargaining with distrust. That knowledge could have helped to
change how the law was structured and prevented the need for the later reforms.' 34
Connected to this is the need to understand, in general, what the public attitudes
are towards the legal system, including the levels of trust and perceptions of cor-
ruption. This should be a standard part of the rule of law assessment process.
Although there is better formal acknowledgement of the need to design rule
of law assistance programs in a way that is appropriate to the actual level of de-
velopment in the country, there is still insufficient information gathered before
programs are designed.135 The standard assessment process involves an assessor
flying into the country and spending a few days or weeks interviewing a standard
group of nationals and internationals.'36  Then the report or project proposal is
prepared, and based on those documents projects are started.'37 While many of
the people conducting these assessments are highly experienced in rule of law
development work, they are not necessarily highly experienced in the particular
country. And, often the only information gathered is anecdotal. If there is likely
to be a poor public reaction to the new ADR program, and if the program design
has already addressed those concerns, then a public education campaign to explain
how the new program would work could help to counteract the poor public per-
ception. However, public education campaigns cannot substitute for poor project
design or lack of rule of law.' 38
E. Is there funding to establish the new ADR process?
If a new program is put into place, but is not funded, it invites the participants
to "self-fund" or look to corruption to make it "work." When international assis-
tance providers encourage countries to adopt legislation providing for new
processes, they often do not include adequate, or any, funding provisions. One
example of this is in Kosovo. Kosovo passed a Mediation Law in 2008.139 The
international community, including the European Union, the World Bank, and the
United States, all supported adopting the law to allow Kosovo to introduce media-
134. The law was changed so that payment of fines alone would not terminate criminal prosecutions.
Also, the law was changed to not allow plea agreements that prevent a defendant from requesting
criminal prosecution against anyone involved in torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Plea Bar-
gaining as a Legal Transplant, supra note 1, at 365-66.
135. For a general description of assessment tools and processes see RULE OF LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 13, at 48-53.
136. For USAID's view of how to conduct a rule of law assessment see GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW
COUNTRY ANALYSIS , supra note 7, at 21-26. See also, Appendix A, with a listing of "assessment
Questions, id at 42-52.
137. Thomas Carothers describes this as an "externality" and is critical of the lack of local ownership
built into the process. Thomas Carothers, Revitalizing Democracy Assistance, The Challenge of
USAID, at 25-26, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2009, available at:
http://www.camcgicendowment.org/files/revitalizingdemocracyassistancc.pdf (last visited April 10,
2011). USAID is typical among international organizations and aid agencies in that they routinely rely
on external assessments as part of the project and program planning process.
138. For descriptions of when this has been attempted and the potential problems, with examples
from Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Qatar, sec Putting Aside the Rule ofLaw Myth, supra note 38, at 346-
56.
139. Law No. 03/L-057 On Mediation, Republic of Kosovo (2008), supra note 62.
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tion into its court system to handle civil cases, primarily commercial disputes.
The Mediation Law did not give a clear timeline for implementation, and did not
provide details for mediator training, certification, and selection.141 The failure to
work out these details at the time the legislation was passed has led to implemen-
tation delays.142 It has also required rule of law development assistance providers
to fund mediation training.143 In the immediate future it is unclear who will pay
the mediators once they are trained, certified, and licensed, and it is also unclear
how much they will get paid.' In a society with serious corruption problems, the
failure to sort out how much mediators will get paid, and who will pay them, in-
vites public skepticism about the legitimacy of mediation and questions about
whether the mediators are corrupt.145
F. Will the ADR program be measured or monitored?
One of the challenges in many moderately functioning legal systems is the
lack of information at all levels of society, including in the formal court system.
This information void creates problems on a number of levels.'4 Therefore, if an
ADR program is introduced, monitoring should be art of the design of the pro-
gram and the results should be publicly available. '4 7  Currently there are ADR
programs funded by USAID, such as a family mediation program in Egypt, that
do not include monitoring, and that do not even gather basic statistics about their
work.148 It might be that these programs are a stunning success on all levels, but
without clear monitoring it is impossible to know if they are helping or impeding
the development of rule of law. Monitoring should gather basic information in-
cluding: the types of cases and whether they are settled; what the participants
think of the process, including whether the process met basic procedural justice
140. Skype Interview (February 16, 2011) with Marilyn Zelin, Senior Legal Advisor, ADR, SEAD
Program in Kosovo (notes on file with author).
141. SYSTEMS FOR ENFORCING AGREEMENTS AND DECISIONS (SEAD) IN Kosovo, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING AN APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 28-43 (April 30, 2010)
http://scadprogram.com/repository/docs/ADR Final Assessment cnglish June 8 2010-mz 2_.pdf.
142. Skype Interview with Marilyn Zelin, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The SEAD Program in Kosovo includes a public outreach component to educate the public
about mediation and as of this writing it is still at too early a stage to evaluate current public attitudes
towards mediation and how seriously corruption concerns are a factor. Id.
146. Due to the persistent difficulty in gathering information in many developing countries, I have
previously suggested that monitoring should be built into rule of law development programs when
introducing new procedures, such as plea bargaining. See Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant,
supra note 1, at 414-15.
147. Better monitoring of mediation programs in the U.S. is a frequent recommendation for a variety
of reasons, including: to improve the program's functioning, to better assess mediator performance,
and to better understand party satisfaction rates. See, e.g., The Place of Court Connected Mediation,
supra note 47, at 142-43 n. 134.
148. It is unknown how many cases are mediated through the program, the issues mediated (divorce,
child custody, etc.), or the outcomes. Skype Interview with Geralyn Busnardo, Chief of Party,
USAIDIEgypt's Family Justice Project (Feb. 3, 2011) (on file with author). Despite the lack of infor-
mation about how many cases have settled or party satisfaction rates, USAID declares the program a
"success story." See USAID, Success Story: Facilitating Peace Within Families, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/storics/gypt/sscgymediation.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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standards; and whether there are concerns about corruption by those using the
process.
Gathering this information would help with future program planning, and if
the results are made public they could help to address potential problems of public
perception with the program. Releasing information that shows high satisfaction
rates among participants, high rates of trust in the process, and low rates of com-
plaints of corruption, could help to counter-act the tendency in negative rule of
law myth countries to dismiss positive developments as aberrations. Greater mon-
itoring and publicly releasing this information could play a role in developing
greater trust by the general public in the ADR process.
If, however, the monitoring results show that the ADR program is not work-
ing, for example due to high dissatisfaction rates among participants or concerns
about corruption, then it would give the ADR implementer an opportunity to ei-
ther address these concerns or, ultimately, to stop the program before it does more
damage.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the question of whether introducing ADR into a
moderately functional legal system, in the context of a country struggling with
endemic corruption, could harm the overall development of rule of law by damag-
ing or further eroding legitimacy in the formal legal system. The intention of this
article is not to suggest that ADR has extraordinary powers to cause harm, but
rather to encourage greater analysis and thought before introducing new
processes. As this article has discussed, the informal and private nature of ADR
can appear to be another form of corruption in societies already struggling with
serious and endemic corruption. Rule of law assistance providers and ADR pro-
fessionals who are responsible for planning projects that include ADR as part of a
rule of law development program should not overlook this possibility or oversim-
plify the process.
The reasons ADR is introduced into rule of law programs are important. In-
creasing access to justice, decreasing costs and time for litigation, increasing satis-
faction with the court system, and decreasing case backlogs are all admirable
goals. However, as we know from experience in the United States, ADR
processes are not without potential problems. ADR professionals and scholars in
the United States continue to ask questions and study how ADR processes are
impacting the legal system, litigants, and the wider society. These questions are
equally, or perhaps more important to ask when considering introducing a new
ADR program into a moderately functional legal system. Rule of law assistance
providers should not assume that the reason for introducing the ADR process is
strong enough to avoid taking the time to consider these factors as part of a
process of trying to determine whether introducing the proposed ADR program
will contribute to building the rule of law. Programs that are introduced without
considering public opinion, and without regard to legitimacy and current public
attitudes towards the legal system, run the risk of working against the goal of de-
veloping rule of law.
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